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Abstract  
Leader debates have become a pre-eminent means of campaign communication in numerous 
countries and were introduced in the UK relatively recently. However, the quality of such 
communication is, to put it mildly, open to question. This article uses the Discourse Quality 
Index (DQI) to assess the deliberative quality of the 2010 UK party leaders’ debates. When 
scrutinized in isolation, and viewed through the full prism of the DQI categories, the quality 
of discourse evidenced in the debates is a relatively poor reflection of mainstream 
idealizations of democratic deliberation. However, when the analysis is rehoused within the 
wider project of constructing a deliberative system in the UK, and is given a comparative 
institutional dimension, the epistemic value of the debates is revealed. The relatively high 
level of justification employed by the party leaders suggests that the debates are a valuable 
means for the mass communication of reasoned defenses of manifesto pledges to the public 
sphere, and that they are likely to have a significant educative effect. Moreover, we argue 
that sequencing such debates with representative deliberative fora will force elites to improve 
the deliberative quality of their communication and enhance the reflective capacity of the 
viewing public.  
Keywords: Deliberative democracy; deliberation; party leaders’ debates; political 
communication 
 
Introduction 
The British political landscape rarely changes in dramatic fashion. This tradition explains 
why the introduction of three leaders’ debates into the 2010 UK general election campaign 
piqued the interest of politicians, commentators and academics alike. Ben Macintyre, writing 
in The Times, referred to the first debate as ‘a crucial punctuation mark in this election, but 
also a milestone in history. British politics will never be the same’ (Macintyre, 2010). 
Chadwick adopts a similar tone when describing the introduction of the debates as ‘the most 
important single development in the British media’s treatment of politics since the arrival of 
television’ (Chadwick, 2011, p.24). The debates certainly garnered massive viewing figures 
and, when the Liberal Democrats surged in the polls following their leader’s perceived 
victory in the first debate, the electoral potential of the debates looked clear.  Even if that 
surge eventually failed to translate into a significant increase in parliamentary seats, the 
debates remained the dominant feature of the 2010 campaign – and the long squabbles over 
the format of the 2015 debates reinforces their perceived electoral importance.   
We therefore agree with Shephard and Johns (2012, p.15) that, ‘given the centrality of the 
debates to the dynamics of the 2010 campaign (and, albeit less directly than anticipated, to 
the eventual outcome), they warrant closer scrutiny’. This article scrutinizes the debates in a 
very specific manner. Our aim is to evaluate the leaders’ debates through the lens of 
deliberative democracy. More specifically, we aim to measure the ‘deliberativeness’ of the 
discourse employed during the debates and to comment on the role leaders’ debates may 
fulfil as part of a wider deliberative system in the UK.  
There are differing anecdotal impressions of the British leader debates’ deliberative 
credentials.  During the 2010 and 2015 campaigns, various commentators expressed concerns 
and were therefore sceptical about the debates’ contribution to the democratic process. The 
main criticisms were that the debates promoted ‘style over substance’ (see Freedland, 2010; 
Marqusee, 2010; Waweru, 2010); that their novelty, in the words of the outgoing and 
incoming Prime Ministers respectively, ‘clouded the need for policy to be debated’ (Watt, 
2010) and ‘sucked the life’ out of the election campaign (LUCRC, 2015); and that ultimately 
‘as Socratic dialogues aimed at uncovering the truth the debates were, almost inevitably, 
failures’ (Pattie and Johnston,  2011, p.150). These appraisals echo criticisms leveled at the 
use of the televised debate in the USA, where it is an established feature of the campaign 
landscape (see, inter alia, Auer, 1962; Bitzer and Router, 1980; Lanoue and Schrott, 1991).  
If true, this would seriously undermine one of the main justifications for such debates, which 
is that their educative effect will improve the quality of democratic decision making 
(Holbrook, 1999). Yet these criticisms stand in stark contrast to the evaluation of Bruce 
Ackerman and James Fishkin (2010) who argued that post-debate poll fluctuations – which 
were a feature of both 2010 and 2015 elections – illustrated the manner in which 
‘deliberation makes a difference’, as each debate ‘precipitated a national conversation that 
encouraged many voters to re-examine their old party identities in light of their policy 
preferences’.  This point, also made in relation to other televised debates (e.g. Carlin and 
McKinney, 1994; Benoit et al., 2003; Coleman, 2000; Patterson, 2002), offers an interesting 
counterpoint to the chorus of criticism.  It also highlights a shared intellectual space occupied 
by media commentators and an academic community interested in deliberative democracy. 
They have common concerns about the quality of policy justifications offered, and the 
manner in which participants engaged with each other. 
By exploring that space in this article, we make two key contributions and speak to different 
audiences. First, a rigorous assessment of deliberative quality is useful for those studying 
leader debates and those concerned with the general democratic health of the UK’s electoral 
democracy. Second, by assessing the debates both in themselves and – crucially – within a 
broader deliberative system, we speak to those interested in the institutionalization of 
deliberative democracy. 
We begin by exploring the deliberative potential of debates in more detail – and noting the 
considerable constraints thereon.  Then we introduce the Discourse Quality Index, the basis 
for our empirical analysis, and present our assessment of the deliberativeness of the 2010 
leader debates.  Although that assessment is mixed at best, we then argue that the debates 
may still have a role to play as part of a wider deliberative system, and pursue that line by 
comparing and contrasting those leader debates with House of Commons debates.  We find 
that, while parliamentary debates exhibit a greater degree of engagement with 
counterarguments and a greater willingness to justify arguments with reference to the 
common good, the leaders’ debates are clearly superior when it comes to compelling 
participants to justify their positions. We thus highlight the potential for different arenas to 
fulfil complementary deliberative functions, which in turn gives our conclusions a more 
optimistic note than had we assessed the debates in isolation. 
 
Leaders’ debates and deliberative democracy 
Early research in the deliberative paradigm was dominated by abstract debates regarding the 
nature of deliberation as a mode of communicative action. The turn of the century, however, 
bore witness to what Chambers (2003) terms the ‘institutional turn’ in deliberative 
democracy, as the focus increasingly shifted towards the problem of how to effectively 
institutionalize the central deliberative ideal of political justification.  As Davidson and Stark 
(2011, p. 157) note: ‘Most deliberative theorists would agree that there are mechanisms 
endogenous to the process of public deliberation which generate decisions that are better 
reasoned and informed; more public-orientated and consensual; and consequently more 
legitimate and effective’. The question is: can leader debates be seen as one such 
mechanism?   
Their potential in this regard is enhanced if they are seen as part of a wider deliberative 
system in which the notion of a continuum of deliberative potential is a foundational 
assumption (Chambers, 2009; Dryzek, 2010; Goodin, 2005; Hendriks, 2006; Mansbridge, 
1999; Mansbridge et al., 2012; Parkinson, 2006; Thompson, 2008). The idea of a deliberative 
system suggests that the norms of deliberative democracy emerge from an institutional 
tapestry rather than a single body or practice. A deliberative system constitutes ‘a set of 
distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts, often with distributed 
functions and a division of labour, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole’  
(Mansbridge et al., 2012 p. 4-5). The concept is neither mechanistic nor bounded but we can 
identify some recurring categories within deliberative systems, each with multiple actors 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 12). Included here are ‘empowered spaces’ populated by elites 
where binding decisions are made. These spaces include parliaments, executives and 
government agencies; ‘public spaces’ where the unstructured and relatively unconstrained 
contestation of discourses occurs. These spaces include civil society associations, social 
movements, the media, the internet, public hearings, mini-publics and public conversation; 
and ‘transmission mechanisms’ that link empowered and public spaces together (Dryzek, 
2009, p. 1385). Mansbridge (1999, p. 277) argues that there should be a continuum of 
deliberative standards across this spectrum of venues. While a shared discursive standard can 
hold across a deliberative system, it should be tightened or relaxed depending on the location 
of the deliberative act: ‘stringent’ versions of the standard should be applied where political 
obligations exist or legitimate authority exercises power, whereas ‘less stringent’ reporting 
exhibited in ‘everyday talk’ should be reserved for more informal settings. Similarly, Goodin, 
in his work on sequencing deliberation, argues that it is important to ‘divide up the 
deliberative task, assigning different portions to different agents, and holding them to 
different evaluative standards accordingly’ (2005, p. 188). And for Bächtiger and 
Steenbergen (2004, p. 3), evaluations of an arena’s deliberative potential have to be sensitive 
to political and institutional realities. A loss of normative purity is therefore inevitable: 
When one is concerned with a more deliberative mode of policymaking in real 
world politics, it is fairly problematic to analytically imply the demanding 
presuppositions of the Habermasian discourse model … Therefore to get hold of 
“deliberation” in the real world of politics, it may be necessary to switch to a 
“weaker” deliberative program ... [D]eliberation is best conceptualized as a 
continuum ranging from more to less deliberative ways of policy making and not 
as a categorical conception where true deliberation is either present or not.    
Once we acknowledge that leader debates operate within a longer sequence, we need not 
expect them to pass every deliberative test with flying colours as their inevitable limitations 
can be offset by other components of that system.  Rather, we must tailor our evaluative 
criteria and emphasise the particular deliberative norms that these debates are expected to 
meet. Our analysis will, therefore, draw on existing research on leaders’ debates to assess the 
quality of discourse that we can realistically expect to see exhibited in such debates.  
This brings us to the question of precisely what deliberative tasks the leaders’ debates may 
reasonably be expected to fulfil within a wider deliberative system. In Hendriks’s (2006) 
terms, they are an example of exclusive, elite-driven deliberation at the formal, ‘micro’ end 
of the spectrum of discursive ‘moments’ that may constitute a deliberative system. In this 
respect they are ‘empowered spaces’ with some similarity to parliamentary debates, which 
Goodin notes are primarily used by elites to publicise arguments. Neither parliamentary nor 
leader debates are venues in which we would expect to see preference transformation or even 
much respect for the demands of an opponent (Goodin, 2005, p. 190). This is particularly true 
in the case of the UK, Westminster being notoriously an arena in which the adversarial norms 
of the UK political system are played out.  
Equally, however, there are important differences between parliamentary and leader debates.  
The latter have much greater capacity to connect actors in different precincts of the polity. 
They have, in the terms of Hendriks (2006) and Parkinson (2006) respectively, a more 
significant ‘mixed’ or ‘intermediate’ dimension.  That is because, being broadcast to millions 
of citizens, they link elite policy proposals directly to public opinion. Consequently, they 
have the capacity to promote transmission between ‘empowered’ and ‘public’ spaces. This is 
important: if an interconnected deliberative system is to be approximated, political elites must 
deliberate publicly and thereby contribute to opinion formation in the public sphere. Related, 
the leaders’ debates also have a far more explicit association with, and closer proximity to, 
elections. This ensures that party leaders engaged in this forum will be more concerned with 
convincing voters of the merits of specific policy proposals than are those deliberating in 
parliamentary settings (and particularly committees), where the focus will inevitably be more 
on scrutinising the detail of draft legislation already mandated. This is not to deny that 
representatives deliberating in parliament will have one eye on the next election; it is more 
that those engaged in the leaders’ debates will have both eyes on the prize.  
This combination of similarities and differences motivates our comparison of leader debates 
and House of Commons debates.  Comparing the leaders’ debates with a forum that is similar 
in deliberative terms, but which differs in terms of the space it occupies within the broader 
political system, enables us to hone in on exactly what role the leaders’ debates may be seen 
to fulfill, if any, within the deliberative system. Do leader debates make a contribution 
beyond that of their closest analogue, precisely because of the differences in function, timing 
and audience highlighted above? Answering this question requires a direct comparison, 
allowing us to gauge what each of the two arenas may contribute in deliberative terms and 
whether and how they might be sequenced. 
It follows from this, but is worth clarifying explicitly, that our aim is not to declare one of 
these two settings to be superior per se.  Indeed, any such claims about the deliberative 
superiority of one institution are of limited on the systemic view whereby these institutions 
are complementary rather than competing.  Rather, we look to provide a contextualized 
account of relative strengths and weaknesses across a range of deliberative criteria.  In the 
next section, we describe those criteria by introducing our means of operationalizing 
deliberation, the Discourse Quality Index, and assess the likely deliberative contribution of 
leader debates against its specific indicators. 
   
Leader debates and the Discourse Quality Index 
The Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is a theoretically-grounded measurement instrument that 
enables researchers to code and analyze quantitatively the deliberative nature of political 
speech acts (Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner, et al., 2004). It emerges principally from a 
Habermasian view of communicative rationality, in which reasoned exchange is presented as 
the means of encouraging preference change and consensus. More specifically, Habermas’s 
(1996) ‘ideal speech situation’ acts as a major evaluative touchstone against which the DQI 
measures deliberative politics in action.  
The DQI is built on seven ethical desiderata that collectively reflect mainstream idealizations 
of deliberation (Thompson, 2008, p. 507). These principles underpin a series of coding 
categories – see Appendix 1 – that allow speech acts to be assessed in terms of their 
deliberative character. Coding commences as soon as a protagonist makes a demand, defined 
simply as ‘a proposal of some sort by an individual or a group on what decisions should or 
should not be made’ (Steiner, et al., 2004 p.170). The breadth of this definition explains why 
it is valid to apply the DQI to discursive contexts beyond the parliamentary arenas to which it 
was first applied. The abstraction of Habermas’s abstract ideal speech situation ensures that 
the DQI categories have general applicability. As Steenbergen et al. (2003, p. 44) stress, 
‘Wherever there is deliberation of some sort and there is a record, the DQI can be applied.’ 
Indeed, they cite televised debates between political candidates as one of the many 
applications to which the DQI might be put.  
Considering the specific DQI categories, several of these shine a light on the extent to which 
the leaders’ debates may contribute to the health of a democratic system. References to the 
common good, social justice, respect for societal groups and respect for the discourse of 
fellow candidates all have the potential to portray party politics in a benevolent light. High 
scores in these categories may contribute to the public perception that the parties and leaders 
in question are actors interested in the larger democratic good, and who have the capacity to 
rise above adversarial party politics. Discourses of this nature might even go run against the 
grain of political disenchantment that leads to low turnouts and apathy towards electoral 
politics. Blais and Parrella (2008), for example, studied the effects of televised debates in the 
USA and Canada, and found that they tend to improve viewers’ evaluations of candidates. 
The authors hypothesize that ‘perhaps the capacity to argue and defend a view is an attribute 
voters expect to see from political leaders. In this light, a debate contributes a positive 
element to the discourse of a democratic election’ (Blais and Parrella, 2008, p. 460).  
If this sounds a little Panglossian, perhaps a more balanced way of extrapolating from 
Goodin’s (2005) arguments is to anticipate that both the positive and negative discursive 
behaviours that he attributes to parliamentary debates will be amplified in the leaders’ 
debates, where the sole aim is to influence voters. Focussing on the positives for the moment, 
high scores in several DQI categories can be interpreted as contributing to this aim. Providing 
sound justifications for policy positions, for example, is clearly relevant to attempts to sway 
public opinion around manifesto pledges. For example, a well-reasoned justification for a 
policy position may enable the electorate to better reflect on the value of that position, which 
should in turn enhance the quality of democratic decision making, as discussed in the 
introduction. Moreover, the clearer the rationale for a manifesto pledge pre-election, the 
sharper the line of accountability that can be drawn between promise and performance post-
election. Hence we might expect to see high DQI scores in this category – a reading 
consistent with An and Pfau’s (2004, p. 432) claim that, in comparison to other traditional 
modes of political communication, televised debates involve ‘more reasoning, clearer 
statements and greater specificity on issues’ and ‘produce more precise, accurate discourse’. 
Pincione and Tesón’s (2006) theory of ‘discourse failure’, however, would lead us to believe 
that elites lack the rational incentives to communicate meaningfully with the electorate. 
Drawing on Anthony Downs’ work, they argue that the electorate, cognizant of the fact that 
their vote will be non-decisive, are not incentivized to overcome the high costs associated 
with acquiring accurate and detailed political information and will therefore remain in a state 
of ‘rational ignorance’ (Pincione and Tesón, 2006, p. 15). This is not to say that citizens 
suspend judgment. But it does mean that, according to Pincione and Teson, rather than 
communicating sound but opaque arguments, it is in the interests of political elites to offer up 
‘vivid’ theories of society ‘that voters find easy to believe’ but which are often ‘false, 
distorted or misleading’ (Pincione and Teson, 2006, p. 15; pp. 21-39). Levasseur and Dean’s 
(1996) longitudinal study of leaders’ debates would appear to verify this hypothesis 
empirically, as they found that participants are more successful when they offer less evidence. 
Similarly, Reinmann and Maurer’s (2005, p. 784) research into the German leaders’ debates 
illustrates the popularity of ‘statements that are rather abstract ambiguous, or vague, 
formulating general goals in such a way that nearly everybody can agree’. 
So, on the one hand, leaders’ debates are ideally placed to fulfil an educative role within the 
deliberative system, particularly in relation to elections, due to their capacity to reach an 
audience of millions. On the other hand, there is a real lack of consensus in the existing 
literature about how far they produce the type of reasoned debate required to ignite that 
educative process. The provision of reasons is the quality required to make a claim about 
deliberation’s educative capacity. It enables participants and audience alike to reflect on the 
premises underlying the policy positions on offer. A reasonable interim conclusion, then, is 
that there is sufficient deliberative potential associated with this dimension of discourse 
quality as to justify our interrogation of the debates along these lines.  
Performance in categories that record respect to fellow protagonists and competing 
discourses are also hard to predict due to a contingent overlap between deliberative principle 
and electoral gain. Candidates may believe that they need to appear ‘Prime Ministerial’ and 
above cheap shots; or they may employ dissent and disrespect instrumentally in an attempt to 
highlight the differences between themselves and the other leaders. The strategic decision of 
whether to promote respect for an opponent’s views will be based upon a leader’s assessment 
of his or her public image prior to, and as it evolves throughout, the series of debates. Again, 
drawing on Goodin’s (2005, p. 191) comments in relation to parliamentary debates, we might 
expect to see respect towards counterargument; however, crucially, this respect is likely to 
take the form of recognition and engagement rather than support: ‘Insofar as 
counterarguments of their opponents threaten to undermine their own case, they respectfully 
register those arguments and attempt to refute them’.  
Benoit’s (2007, 2014) work on the ‘functional theory’ of political campaign discourse also 
has explanatory value here. He identifies three main types of discourse and subjects them to 
cost-benefit analyses in order to generate hypotheses regarding their likely usage. Acclaims, 
or proclamations made by candidates regarding their own strengths and accomplishments, 
will be used most according to the functional theory as there is no associated cost; attacks on 
opponents’ character or record will be used less frequently than acclaims because they risk 
putting off some voters and may trigger accusations of excessive negativity; finally, defenses 
will be the least prevalent form of discourse for three main reasons: i) they threaten to 
sidetrack the defending candidate and draw them onto territory more favorable to their 
opponent; ii) they risk making candidates appear as though they are on the back-foot; and iii) 
they may simply invite further unwanted attention to potential weaknesses (Benoit, 2014, p. 
13-19; Airne and Benoit, 2005, p. 344-346). In a recent work, Benoit (2014) subjects an 
impressive range of American presidential debates to content analysis and reports findings 
that confirm the predictions of functional theory (Benoit, 2014, p. 38).  
Turning to the content of justifications, here it is easier to derive clear expectations from the 
existing literature. As Goodin (2005, p. 191-192) recognizes when discussing the type of 
discourse one would expect to see during an election campaign, voters’ decisions have been 
shown to be motivated more by the national interest than by self-interest (see Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier, 2013, p. 370). This being the case, it is strategically expedient for political parties, 
and in our case the party leaders, to ‘orientate their appeals’ accordingly by making regular 
references to the common good (Goodin, 2005, p. 192). Likewise, appeals to group interests 
and respect for specific groups are also a likely feature of a leaders’ debate because of the 
need to ‘bridge’ and ‘bond’ (Dryzek, 2010) with sectional interests in order to bring voters 
into a winning coalition. We also should be under no illusion that preference transformation – 
that essential ingredient for the deliberative democrat – would probably be perceived as 
electoral suicide for a party leader tied to manifesto pledges. Thoughtfully ruminating on 
another leaders’ argument; changing one’s position as a consequence of better reasoning; 
attempting to provide a mediating third way in a spirit of accommodation – these are 
discursive strategies which could project weakness and indecision. Indeed, the findings of the 
DQI as applied by its original architects highlight this point by showing how adversarial 
democracies (such as the UK) score far lower on the constructive politics indicators than 
more consensual nations (Steiner et al., 2004, p.112-113). 
Bringing these factors together we conclude that the leaders’ debates should be analysed in a 
way that is respectful all of all deliberative norms but places a greater level of expectation on 
the following criteria:  
x The degree of sophistication employed in justifications for demands 
x The respect given to counterarguments  
x The extent to which protagonists’ reason around notions of the common good  
 
Analysis of the leaders’ debates 
Before testing these expectations, some notes on methodology are necessary. A first 
important point is that we interpreted the nature of a demand in broad terms so that we could 
trigger the DQI coding as much as possible. A demand was recorded when a leader made a 
specific policy proposal, electoral pledge, defined their or their party’s position on an issue or 
provided a rationale as to why a citizen should decide to vote for their party. We also began 
to code if a leader made a statement in which a demand was implicit. For example, when 
David Cameron tells the Prime Minister that the level of net migration in the UK is too high, 
we construed that as a demand for lower levels of migration. This inclusive approach meant 
that the only passages of text which were excluded from analytical treatment were those 
involving the debate facilitator and audience members and those in which the protagonist 
made exchanges – often attacks on each other – which were unconnected to demands. As a 
consequence, over 94% of debate content was coded. This does not mean, however, that all 
speech acts coded were especially relevant to the DQI categories. Many speech acts 
contained demands but little else which could be considered relevant to our framework. 
Defining the percentage of DQI-relevant versus DQI-irrelevant content within these speech 
acts is beyond the scope of this paper. The key point is that very few speech acts were 
rejected a priori as irrelevant.   
In total Coder 1 and Coder 2 [names removed for review purposes] coded 321 speech acts 
across the three 2010 debates, resulting in the creation of 2247 codes. As is standard practice, 
we subjected 20% (73) of speech acts to inter-coder reliability testing. Appendix 2 reports 
various measures summarizing the similarities of the two coders’ judgments on the six DQI 
indicators used in this article. Following Steiner et al. (2004), we calculate: i) the percentage 
agreement – that is, the proportion of instances that the two coders gave exactly the same 
code. The overall percentage agreement of 93% (359 of the 386 codes) matches the high 
levels of reliability reported by Steiner et al. (2004), and the reliability levels are consistent 
across the sub-components of the DQI; ii) Cohen’s kappa. All of the kappa statistics exceed 
0.8, confirming that these very high levels of agreement are way above what would be 
expected by chance; iii) Spearman’s rho, which shows that the rankings of both coders are 
very reliable  (all over 0.75 and hence very strong). Together, the data in the table point to 
strong inter-coder reliability and thus underpin our findings. 
The one departure we make from the scheme devised by Steiner et al. (2004) concerns the 
Participation category. Their DQI coding manual stipulates that an interruption is recorded 
only in instances where the original speaker verbally registers a complaint about it (Steiner, et 
al, 2004, p.171). This is apposite for parliamentary debates, in which there are well known 
procedures for directing complaints to a speaker, presiding officer or chair. In the leaders’ 
debates, however, applying this criterion strictly resulted in the prima facie finding that no 
interruptions took place. In reality, of course, there were interruptions in the leaders’ debates. 
But, since they were not explicitly commented on by participants, the ‘interruptions’ category 
was left empty.  
Moving on to the treatment of the data, a decision is required about whether to treat the DQI 
categories separately or in combination.  For any given speech act, for example, an aggregate 
score of fifteen is possible. We might therefore choose to use the average score per speech act 
as a yardstick with which to evaluate the performance of each leader. Similarly, we could 
judge the deliberative quality of the debates by generating a total DQI score and comparing 
this against the total possible score that could have been achieved.  We choose not to 
aggregate the data in this manner. As Thompson has pointed out, previous empirical research 
in this field has been plagued with problems associated with definitions of deliberation that 
congeal normative criteria into a single evaluative whole (Thompson, 2008, p. 501). These 
preclude a more nuanced understanding of the various dimensions that may constitute 
different modes and degrees of deliberation (Bächtiger and Steenbergen, 2004, p. 12). 
The results of our coding are reported in Table 1.  Our analysis begins with a straightforward 
statement: by the yardsticks of the DQI, the debates were a poor approximation of the norms 
of deliberation. In the vanguard of our negative commentary is the measurement of 
constructive politics. As hypothesized above, one of the defining features of a deliberative 
process – a willingness to adjust preferences and demands in accordance with the force of 
better argument – was completely absent from these debates. Our respect categories also 
support our initial statement. There is a negligible degree of respect amongst the leaders for 
each other’s demands and counterarguments. Indeed, 92% of the coding in this category 
records either no respect – where a protagonist denigrates the position of another – or a 
neutral code, where the statements of others are simply not acknowledged. When the leaders 
discuss constitutional reform in the first debate, for example, Liberal Democrat leader Nick 
Clegg summarizes the demands of the other two leaders in withering terms, describing them 
as ‘a betrayal’, ‘a con’ and as rhetoric that will remain unmatched in reality. Returning fire, 
Clegg’s own demands are claimed by David Cameron to emerge from a ‘holier than thou’ 
attitude, while then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s proposals are presented as little more 
than an electoral ‘ploy’. Such posturing does not score well on the DQI. Sandwiched between 
these exchanges, however, is a rare example of the demands of another being respected – an 
example of the now infamous ‘I agree with Nick’ narrative espoused by Gordon Brown: 
‘There’s got to be a right of recall for people who are in a constituency and find their MPs 
corrupt and parliament doesn't act. I agree with that. I think Nick also agrees with me’.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The story in relation to respect to counterarguments is similar. Across the 321 total speech 
acts we found only five counterarguments that were explicitly valued by an opposition leader. 
Instances of the ‘I agree with Nick’ statement are captured by this coding category. Rather 
than credit the deliberative nature of such a statement, however, the British media more often 
than not presented them as a sign of prime ministerial weakness and/or used them to signify 
the rising fortunes of the Liberal Democrats (see, for example, Freedland, 2010). This is 
perhaps why no further instances of valued counterarguments were coded until the third 
debate.  In line with Benoit’s predictions about debaters’ reluctance to be forced onto the 
defensive, most counterarguments were either ignored completely (38%) or acknowledged 
before being degraded (46%).  
When turning to those categories that examine the nature and sophistication of justifications 
employed in the debates, however, we see some chinks of light. While only 5% of demands 
were justified with reference to the common good, when it comes to the level of justification 
used to advocate demands we observe a relatively high degree of sophistication. Roughly half 
(49%) of demands were underpinned by qualified or sophisticated justifications. Indeed, 
qualified justifications (33%) represent the modal category of this DQI variable. An example 
of a sophisticated justification can be seen in the second leaders’ debate when Nick Clegg 
defends European Union membership by explicitly connecting it to the mitigation of 
international crime, combating the threat of climate change and the need for regulatory 
oversight of the banking industry.  
Considering these dimensions together, our initial assessment is that the brand of discourse 
employed in the leaders’ debates can best be characterized as weak and somewhat lopsided. 
To deliberate entails communicating and responding to reasoned arguments. What the DQI 
illustrates is that the debates were relatively deliberative in the first instance: they were a 
forum where reasons were provided for a policy stance in the majority of cases. When it 
comes to reciprocal aspect of deliberation – which involves acknowledging, responding to 
and respecting the arguments of others – the picture is less positive.  
However, as we argued above, to dismiss entirely the deliberative contribution of leader 
debates on the basis of Table 1 would be to ignore the emergent strand of literature focused 
upon deliberative systems. We can better understand the potential role of debates within such 
a system by comparing them with alternative elite-driven, ‘real world’ arenas of deliberation. 
Thus we can pinpoint what, if anything, is distinctive in deliberative terms about the leaders’ 
debates and the contribution that they might make. In an earlier section, we identified various 
differences between parliamentary and leaders’ debates in terms of their location and 
function within the wider political system, and commented on the ways in which these 
differences may manifest themselves in divergent discursive behaviours. In the next section, 
we put those suggestions to the empirical test by comparing our leader debates data with 
parallel measurements from Westminster debates.  
Comparative analysis 
Our comparison is based on three Westminster debates already coded according to the DQI by 
Andre Bächtiger.1 These three debates concerned the minimum wage (16 December 1997), 
Sunday trading laws (9 February 1994) and disability issues (26 February 1993) – thus 
providing at least some of the issue diversity that characterises the leader debates. Although 
these parliamentary sessions all predate by a long way the leader debates of 2010, there seems 
no obvious reason to suppose that the deliberative quality of House of Commons debate has 
changed appreciably in the interim. More potentially disruptive of comparison is the fact that 
two of these debates – the latter two – were on issues of relatively weak party discipline. 
Since this might be expected to encourage a less adversarial and hence more deliberative 
discussion, we should acknowledge that Westminster goes into our comparison with a small 
head-start. 
The results of our analysis, with significance tests and appropriate measures of association for 
each comparison, are presented in Table 2. It is immediately evident that, in line with our 
expectations, neither setting is going to be praised by deliberative democrats for the level of 
constructive politics on display. The Commons debates contained twelve examples of 
alternative proposals: only 6% of those coded but enough for a statistically significant 
advantage over the leaders’ debates. However, the absence of any mediating proposals, and 
the fact that positional politics dominates the discourse in each institution, means that this 
difference is relatively weak. This corroborates existing research suggesting that elites will 
                                                          
1 For more details on these debates – including the reliability estimates that, as we have already noted, are 
comparable to our own – see Steiner et al.(2004, ch. 5).We are very grateful to Professor Bächtiger for 
supplying the coded data to us for our own analysis. 
engage in constructive politics and preference change, but only in private (Chambers, 2003) 
and that evaluative criteria based upon notions of constructive politics and preference 
transformation do not offer a realistic means of audit at this end of the deliberative system 
(Goodin, 2005).  
(Table 2 about here) 
Turning to one of our privileged norms, we do, however, record a higher proportion of 
justifications for policy demands in the leaders’ debates than in the Commons debates. This is 
a significant difference between the two institutions. The Commons debates contained more 
demands (43% compared to 24%) in which conclusions were not linked to premises in any 
way. From this we conclude that the leaders’ debates, perhaps because of their high visibility, 
compel protagonists to provide some degree of justification for their policy proposals, and to a 
greater extent than in a legislative context. This runs counter to previous research in which it 
has been argued that legislature plenary sessions enjoy a comparative advantage over other 
deliberative fora when it comes to the promulgation of justifications that can assist the 
formation of citizen preferences (Landwehr and Holzinger, 2010, p. 397). One reason for that 
supposed advantage could be the greater leisure afforded to parliamentarians to provide the 
multiple justifications that qualify as ‘sophisticated’ in the DQI framework. The more clock-
constrained debaters were often confined to making single points – hence the preponderance 
of ‘qualified’ justifications in that particular cell of Table 2. Treating the levels as ordered 
categories and using the full DQI measure, we record a relatively weak association (Kendall’s 
tau-c = -0.10) in this category because the Westminster debates’ clear disadvantage in terms 
of the number of unjustified claims is offset by their advantage in terms of sophisticated 
justifications.  However, if we collapse the ‘qualified’ and ‘sophisticated’ categories – in 
effect, focusing only on quality rather than quantity of justification – then the advantage for 
the leader debates is more pronounced: tau-c strengthens to -0.19. We can conclude that the 
leaders’ debates are indeed an institution that promotes the use of justifications. However, 
where justifications are offered, the more indulgent context of the Westminster plenary is 
more likely to generate the multiple arguments that meet the DQI’s gold standard.    
Respect given to counterarguments is our next privileged criterion. Both institutions can be 
criticised for engendering, or at least not inhibiting, high levels of degrading argumentation. If 
we should expect to see, at the very least, a form of procedural respect to the 
counterarguments presented by others in elite deliberations then we must report a shared 
institutional weakness here. However, the election debates are significantly weaker than those 
in the Commons. Key to this is the leaders’ tendency simply to ignore each other’s 
counterarguments. In Westminster there is a greater tendency to acknowledge the 
counterarguments of others with neutral statements rather than ignoring them outright. Also, 
fewer counterarguments were explicitly valued during the leaders’ debates, although both 
settings score poorly in this regard.  
If we broaden out the analysis to consider the other respect codes the narrative remains similar. 
Neither forum impresses in terms of the respect given to groups to be helped and the demands 
of other policymakers (reflected in the high levels of neutral coding). And there is no 
significant difference between the discursive treatment of groups in either institution. 
However, it still appears that respect is a commodity that is traded more easily across the floor 
of the Commons than under the spotlights of the television studio. The respect for demands 
coding shows that policy proposals are less likely to be denigrated in the House of Commons, 
and the overall mean respect calculation shows a substantial and significant divide between 
the two institutions.   
Looking to the content of justification, there were more references to the common good and 
fewer references to sectional interests in the Westminster debates. The former finding runs 
counter to Goodin’s (2005) expectations, as outlined above. Admittedly, the neutral categories 
are loaded again on both counts so we would stress that both types of debate are weak when it 
comes to this kind of policy advocacy. However, Westminster is stronger again in this 
comparison and the distinction is unambiguously significant, being based on meaningful 
differences in all coding categories. 
We can present a more fine-grained examination of the common good here, based on the DQI 
architects’ distinction between two principles or interpretations thereof. One code captures 
advocacy based around the utilitarian principle of the greatest good to the greatest number, 
whereas the difference interpretation is based on the Rawlsian notion that inequality is 
justified when it favours the disadvantaged. Our findings show that the House of Commons 
debates contained fewer references to the national interest, framed in utilitarian terms, and 
more references to helping disadvantaged groups as part of improving the common good. 
Here the difference between the subject matter being debated in each forum is important. 
While contemporary elections are fought around valence issues that reflect agreement across 
parties and leaders (after all, who doesn’t want a strong economy?), Westminster debates tend 
to focus more on the minutiae of policy differences and the distributional effects of these 
differences in terms of constituencies. The former privileges reference to the national interest 
on a grand scale, whereas the latter encourages a narrower but more representative policy 
debate.  
 
Putting the Debates in their Place   
We can now assess what the leaders’ debates might bring to a deliberative system. First, we 
should restate that neither arena is particularly conducive to deliberation when viewed 
through the full prism of the DQI. The House of Commons debates, however, tend to be more 
deliberative in two of the areas that constitute our distilled evaluative framework: the 
discourse exhibits more respect for reasoned counterarguments and a greater willingness to 
debate around notions of the common good. There is, however, a significant area in which the 
leaders’ debates are clearly superior, which is that participants felt much more often 
compelled to justify their positions.  
These findings are of obvious relevance to the potential educative impact of each setting. 
According to a post-debate poll reported by Blumler (2011, p. 39), 68% of respondents felt 
that they knew more ‘about the policies of each party’ following the debates, and 53% 
believed the debates had helped them to ‘understand the problems which the country is 
facing’. In a focus group study, Watts (2002) reports voters praising the potential for debates 
to go deeper into issues, to communicate candidates’ stances on a wider range of topics and 
give a sense of the integrity of leaders (Watts, 2002, p. 27). Turning from subjective to 
objective assessments of learning, several studies indicate that televised debates improve 
voters’ knowledge of policy positions (Benoit et al., 2003; Just et al., 1990; Kraus, 2000; 
Patterson, 2002; Pfau et al., 2001). Even if the parliamentary debates had enjoyed similar 
audiences, our comparison in terms of level of justification suggests that they would have a 
lesser educative effect. When we consider that parliamentary debates are viewed by only a 
minuscule fraction of the audience for televised leader debates (BBC 2012, p. 39), the point is 
reinforced. As a means of communicating reasoned defences of manifesto pledges, these 
debates represent a valuable educative component of the deliberative system. 
We believe that the leaders debates can be perform a significant role in this regard.  For this 
reason we build upon Goodin’s (2005) work on deliberative sequencing in order to elaborate 
an additional criterion by which the leaders’ debates may be evaluated: the degree to which 
they encourage public debate and participation in other areas of the deliberative system. It is 
not possible to make such assessments directly using the DQI; however, again, prior research 
gives grounds for optimism. Coleman (2011, p. 74) reports that 87% of respondents to a post-
election survey claimed to have talked to other people after having watched or listened to the 
debates. The quality of this discourse is not known but it is worth reiterating Mansbridge’s 
point that even ‘everyday talk’ can play an integral role in a deliberative system. Thelwall 
(2011) supplements these survey findings by using the Blogpulse tracking service to record 
social media reaction to the debates. Not only did the debates trigger the major spikes of 
activity during the election campaign – as indeed they did again in 2015 (Bainbridge, 2015) – 
but, more pertinently, Thelwall’s (2011, p. 58-59) analysis also enables us to comment on the 
form this discourse takes: although fewer than 10% of bloggers engaged with arguments 
raised in the first debate, this increased to approximately 25% regarding the second debate 
and just short of 20% for the third. Hardly a victory for substance over style, but nonetheless 
evidence of leader debates stimulating more public engagement with policy issues than does 
more or less any other arena. 
Parallel findings have been recorded in studies of leader debates elsewhere, emphasising their 
capacity to ‘engage citizens in the political process’ (Kraus 2000, p. 123). And survey 
research has shown that US leaders’ debates ‘widen the circle of conversation’ around 
campaigns by stimulating greater amounts of discussion beyond traditional family units 
(Patterson 2002 p, 123). Furthermore, An and Pfau (2004) found that, despite the 
confrontational style of the debates, they still do not undermine participatory attitudes in the 
way that Mutz’s (2002) arguments might imply. Indeed, compared to other less restrained 
forms of campaigning, debates tend to lead to more positive views about the democratic 
process amongst viewers than other campaign formats (Pfau et al., 2001; though see Spiker 
and McKinney, 1999, for a counter-example).  The evidence is mixed on whether debates can 
go so far as to increase voter turnout, especially amongst groups that lack interest in politics 
(Cavanaugh, 1995; Faas and Maier, 2004).  Nonetheless, the capacity of debates to generate 
engagement is clear.  
Of most direct relevance here is the study by Cho and Choy that seeks to ascertain ‘the 
potential of televised debates to contribute to a deliberative democracy. In this view, televised 
debates facilitate the democratic process not only by directly providing voters with relevant 
information but also by encouraging voters to engage in communicative activities through 
which they reflect, both intrapersonally and interpersonally, upon politics and the campaign 
themselves’ (2011, p.779). Cho and Choy thus anticipate that leader debates can stimulate not 
just Goodin’s (2005) notion of ‘deliberation within’, discussed below, but also Mansbridge’s 
(1999) everyday talk. In short: ‘if televised debates stimulate subsequent news consumption 
and political conversation, it is also likely that they promote citizen deliberation and 
democracy’ (Cho and Choy 2011, p.779). Results from their study reveal that watching the 
debates leads to increased information-seeking about candidates and political discussions 
within social networks n 
. The buzz generated by debates can also encourage citizens who did not see them to join the 
discussion too. Consequently, Cho and Choy (2011, p.794) conclude that leaders’ debates 
‘contribute to democratic processes by offering a mediated context for collective deliberation 
involving elites and citizens’. This mediated context provides a bridge for discourses in a 
deliberative system, which connects empowered and public spaces together.   
More indirectly, we can also examine how the specific nature of the discourse exhibited in the 
leaders’ debates may facilitate public debate and transmission. The relatively sophisticated 
level of justification employed by the leaders provides viewers with something substantive to 
grasp on to in deliberative terms. But there is more to linking elites and citizens than simply 
forwarding reasons for one’s position. As Elstub (2010) notes, a key element of the second 
and third generations of deliberative democracy is recognition of the role that certain types of 
rhetoric may fulfil in connecting communicative arenas within a deliberative system 
(Chambers, 2009; Dryzek, 2010). Chambers especially believes that ‘deliberative rhetoric’ 
can play a vital role in encouraging thoughtfulness and debate ‘out there’ in the public spheres 
of the deliberative system. It encourages ‘thoughtfulness’ and ‘considered reflection about a 
future action’ on the part of those exposed to debate: ‘It ought to spark active reasoning and 
thoughtfulness rather than unreflective triggers or gut reactions’ (Chambers, 2009, p. 335). 
Crucial given our focus, moreover, is Chambers’s claim that such rhetoric can help foster a 
deliberative relationship between rhetorician and audience even when the listener cannot 
respond or hold the orator to account. Hence the insertion of an emotive statement alongside a 
policy rationale might be the very reason why a viewer pauses to reflect.  
Prior studies of leaders’ debates go some way to supporting this view by confirming that 
viewers can be reached by rhetorical appeals if a leader employs the correct argumentative 
structure. In their analysis of viewer responses to the 2005 German Chancellor debate, for 
example, Nagel et al. (2012, p. 842) show that the viewing public respond negatively to 
ambivalence and that opinions about the use of evidence varied across leaders, but that 
emotional appeals consistently impress the viewing audience in positive ways. These findings 
allow Nagel and his co-authors to unfold an argument that verbal communication, defined as 
an argumentative strategy that combines issue, tone, evidence and rhetoric (Nagel et al., 2012, 
p. 834-835), can be more important than visual and vocal elements when it comes to audience 
impression (Nagel et al., 2012, p. 846). The key message for our research is that there is a 
connection between rhetorical flourish and citizen stimulus during a debate and that in terms 
of viewer positivity, rhetoric is more convincing than justifications via evidence. Building 
upon this is our deliberative system claim, which is that combining rhetoric with a meaningful 
policy justification can turn viewer stimulus into viewer reflection and that this is a sign of 
deliberative rhetoric in action.   
There are many examples, across all of the debates, in which rhetorical flourishes are 
accompanied by – and potentially draw attention to – qualified and sophisticated justifications. 
Consider the following quotation:  
Our tax system is grotesquely unfair. After 13 years of Labour, who would have 
believed that you would have now a tax system where a multimillionaire from the 
City of London, pays a lower rate of tax on their capital gains, that's income to 
you or me, than their cleaner does on their wages. After 13 years of Labour, we 
have the bottom 20% of people in this country who pay more in tax as a 
proportion of their income than the top 20%. I think we need to change that. 
David Cameron says you can't afford tax giveaways. No, you can't. What you can 
do is switch the tax system, make it fair. Make sure that those huge loopholes that 
only people right at the top, very wealthy people who can afford a football team of 
lawyers and accountants to get out of paying tax, close those loopholes, give the 
money back to people so that they pay no income tax on the first £10,000 that you 
earn. That's £700 back in the pocket of the vast majority of you in this country.   
Clegg’s sophisticated justification of tax reform, appealing to both the common good and the 
Rawlsian difference principle, provides the raw materials for public reflection. He also, 
however, uses rhetoric to draw attention to these reasoned arguments. There is an arresting 
pathos in the comparison of the multimillionaire and the cleaner and in the story of how the 
rich can afford a ‘football team’ of lawyers and accountants to avoid taxation, and the 
reference to capital gains tax as ‘income to you or me’ is an example of what Dryzek (2010) 
terms ‘bonding rhetoric’, as it is designed both to associate Clegg with the common voter and 
to distance him from Cameron. If the argument of Nagel et al. (2012) is correct, then the 
frequent use of such deliberative rhetoric in these debates will have boosted their educative 
potential for communicating reason and enhancing reflection. 
These findings can launch an analysis of how leaders’ debates may be sequenced with other 
fora. In large-scale societies such as the UK, mass debates where all are conversationally 
present are an impossibility. This being the case, Goodin proposes that we rely more on 
facilitating ‘deliberation within’ – or people’s ‘empathic imaginings to put themselves in the 
place of the other’ (Goodin, 2000 p. 81). Deliberation on this reading ‘is less a matter of 
making people “conversationally present” and more a matter of making them “imaginatively 
present” in the minds of deliberators’ (Goodin, 2000, p. 83).  
The leaders’ debates can assist this process, as they have the capacity to act as a catalyst for 
internal reflection within the electorate due to their ability to produce deliberative rhetoric. 
However, listening to a small number of elected elites will have a limited impact with respect 
to the diversity of groups made ‘imaginatively present’ to the debate viewers. To facilitate 
inclusivity of ‘empathic imaginings’ amongst the electorate we therefore suggest sequencing 
the leaders’ debates with representative fora that enable a microcosm of the electorate to be 
conversationally present and to discuss the proposals and arguments forwarded during the 
debate. An appropriate candidate for this type of sequencing would be Deliberative Polls, 
events explicitly ‘designed to show what the public would think about the issues, if it thought 
more earnestly and had more information about them’ (Luskin et al., 2002, p. 258). In such a 
scenario, a representative sample of voters would be surveyed to determine their opinions on 
the range of issues to be covered in the debate and/ or the candidates and their parties. They 
would then watch the leaders’ debates before deliberating, and finally their views would be 
canvassed again in order to measure preference transformation. An alternative approach is to 
use deliberative polls to determine the questions for the televised debates (Ackerman and 
Fishkin, 2004, p. 25). It is vital that these discussions are televised so that they are able to 
influence the internal reflective process of the wider population. Leaders’ debates, when 
sequenced with deliberative polls, would then enable transmission from public to empowered 
space too, which is crucial to interconnecting the deliberative system.  
Alternatively, the leaders’ debates could then form a crucial component of Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s (2004) vision of ‘Deliberation Day’. This would take the form of a national holiday, 
held one week in advance of the election, in which all registered voters are invited to gather in 
local meeting places to discuss the merits of the various parties and candidates in a 
combination of small groups and plenary sessions. Crucially, Ackerman and Fishkin suggest 
that the day opens with citizens sitting together ‘to watch a live television debate on the 
leading issues between the principal national candidates’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2003, p. 13). 
The leaders’ debates would fit neatly into this slot with Deliberation Day supplying ‘a context 
within which citizens can expose the candidates’ claims to disciplined scrutiny and further 
exploration’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004, p. 42).  
In turn, the fact that the party leaders would know that their televised debates were to be 
subject to in-depth public deliberation might well persuade those leaders to rely less on 
rhetoric and to offer more justifications for their policy positions (Ackerman and Fishkin, 
2004, p. 81).  The prospect of Deliberation Day might even provide an incentive to improve 
the election campaign debate across the board: ‘By placing the D Day near the end of the 
campaign, we hope to reshape everything that goes before’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004, 
p.87).  Casting this broader argument in the specific terms of this article, we would argue that 
such deliberative sequencing has the potential not only to expand the ‘empathic imaginings’ 
of participants and television audiences but also to alleviate the problem of ‘discourse failure’ 
(Pincione and Téson, 2006). Evidence from mini-publics already demonstrates that, when 
citizens deliberate together, their preferences tend to become better informed, with cognitive 
errors being corrected (Fishkin, 2009). As a consequence elites would have an incentive to 
alter their approach to the debates: ‘They would no longer automatically suppose that 
candidates were best sold in eight-second soundbites. Throughout the campaign, their eyes 
would be fixed firmly on the fact that their messages would be subjected to a day-long 
dissection – and that millions of votes might swing as a result’ (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003, 
p. 24).  
 
Conclusion 
Our first conclusion is that the quality of discourse on display in the leaders’ debates falls well 
short of mainstream idealizations of democratic deliberation. This is very much in line with 
expectation. We must therefore agree with Cho and Choy (2011, p.792) that ‘it would be 
overly idealistic to claim that televised debates are political dialogue in which candidates 
deliberate about issues of national concern’. We also agree that there is though, more to these 
debates than the studio-based discourse.  
When we rehouse our analysis within the context of creating a deliberative system, 
recalibrate our evaluative standards accordingly, and engage in comparative analysis with 
Westminster debates, the functional value of the leaders’ debates is unveiled. The leaders’ 
debates achieve elevated scores when it comes to compelling participants to employ reasoned 
justifications for their policy positions. Consequently our second conclusion is that the 
debates have a valuable role to play in a deliberative system, as they enable the mass 
communication of reasoned justifications and defenses of policy pledges to the public sphere 
during election campaigns. They can take the justifications for political action and transmit 
them from empowered official venues to public spaces. As such, they have the capacity to 
promote informed public reflection and thereby enhance the quality of decision making at the 
ballot box.  
Two strands of research will be required in order to develop this initial claim. The first is to 
exploit the comparative potential in this analysis. The DQI can and should be applied to 
future elections, not only in Britain but elsewhere.  In particular, we would like to test the 
consistency of our finding about the propensity of these debates to produce relatively high 
levels of justification. Through this further empirical research, we can begin to generalise 
about leaders’ debates as an institution through more nuanced analysis of the effects that 
individuals, issues and debate sequencing can have on aggregated DQI categories.  
Second, more research is required to test our claim that it is the educative capacity of leaders’ 
debate that secures their relevance within a deliberative system. There is the usual trade-off 
between internal and external validity in designing such research.  Experimental designs, in 
which subjects are randomly assigned among debate and control conditions, score highly on 
the former.  However, we still need to track the effects of such exposure across time and 
there remains the risk of a Hawthorne effect whereby the failure to recreate the everyday 
reality of debate exposure means that we overstate effect sizes (see Jerit et al., 2013). 
Meanwhile, election study panel data, increasingly accessible given the low cost of the 
internet survey mode, offer some traction for testing whether debate exposure facilitates 
greater levels of individual reflection about policy positions during a campaign period and, 
more importantly, whether that exposure acts as a stimulus for forms of ‘everyday talk’ about 
campaign promises.  Yet survey self-reports are a clumsy measure of the key dependent 
variables and concerns about endogeneity – with only those ready to get more engaged likely 
to watch debates attentively – are hard to shake off.  As usual, it is through a combination of 
these different methods that progress is most likely to be made. 
Finally, we argue that specific empirical arguments, which engage with the details of 
sequencing in particular political contexts, are now required if deliberative systems are to 
emerge. In doing so, specific relational analyses can also allow us to examine the validity of 
the systemic concept itself as it plays out across different institutional configurations. We 
have argued in this paper that the educative capacity of leaders’ debates can be further 
enhanced by sequencing them with deliberative polls or deliberation days. We believe two 
benefits can accrue from this. First, it will enhance what Goodin calls ‘deliberation within’, 
by expanding the ‘empathic imaginings’ of those who are not ‘conversationally present’ 
(Goodin, 2000, p. 81-83). Second, carefully planned and carefully sampled mini-publics can 
provide balance to the more organic and unregulated components of a deliberative system. 
These components may have the capacity to generate much in the way of everyday talk and 
deliberation within but that does not necessarily guarantee a proper consideration of all sides 
of an argument. This is where the well-crafted mini-public can play a significant role in 
conjunction with leaders’ debates.  
Our analysis indicates that there is mileage in the systemic concept in the UK context. It has 
allowed us to make the case that sequencing the leaders’ debates with representative 
deliberative fora in which a microcosm of the electorate is ‘conversationally present’ would 
serve to expand and diversify the internal reflections of the British electorate and to stimulate 
further public deliberation. We conclude, therefore, that the leaders’ debates could become 
the centrepiece of a reinvigorated deliberative system during UK elections. 
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 Appendix 1: DQI Principles and Codes  
The Deliberative Principle  Corresponding DQI Code 
There should be open 
participation in the 
dialogue 
Participation (P) measures the ability of participants to debate without interference from other contributors. These 
codes record the frequency of interruptions that draw complaints from protagonists.   
Code 0 : interruption of speaker 
Code 1 : normal participation of speaker 
Assertions should be 
introduced and assessed 
through reason 
Level of Justification (LJ) assesses the link between the justification for a demand and the demand itself. Where 
there is no link between a demand and a justification this would be coded as ‘inferior’. Where there is a clear link 
between a demand and the premise that justifies it this would coded as ‘qualified’. Where two or more qualified 
justifications are provided this would be considered ‘sophisticated’.  
Code 0 : no justification 
Code 1 : inferior justification 
Code 2 : qualified justification 
Code 3 : sophisticated justification 
Participants should 
consider the common good 
Content of Justification (CJ) ascertains whether or not a demand is justified in terms of sectoral interests or the 
common good. The latter are then split into those that frame the common good in terms of assisting the most 
disadvantaged (Rawlsian) or in terms of the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarian).  
Code 0: explicit statement concerning group or constituency interests 
Code 1: neutral statement 
Code 2a: explicit statement of the common good (utilitarian) 
Code 2b: explicit statement of common good (Rawlsian) 
Respect should be shown 
for social groups 
Respect for Groups (RTG) measures the empathy that participants have for specific sections of society. 
Code 0 : no respect 
Code 1 : neutral 
Code 2 : explicit respect 
The demands of other 
participants should be 
respected 
Respect for Demands (RDO) measures the instances of a protagonist being positive or negative about the demands 
being discussed.  
Code 0 : no respect 
Code 1 : neutral 
Code 2: explicit respect    
 
The opposing arguments of 
other participants should be 
respected 
Respect towards Counterarguments (RTC) evaluates reactions to counterarguments.  
Code 0 : counterarguments are ignored 
Code 1 : counterarguments are acknowledged but explicitly degraded 
Code 2: counterarguments are acknowledged but the response is neutral  
Code 3: counterarguments are acknowledged and at least one is explicitly valued 
Participants should strive 
towards compromise 
solutions and preference 
transformation 
Constructive Politics (CP) examines the extent to which participants are prepared to reach compromise through 
changing their position on a demand. Positional politics means that no attempt is made. A mediating proposal 
acknowledges contrary viewpoints and proposes an alternative on which protagonists might agree. An alternative 
proposal is a mediating proposal that is not relevant to that specific demand yet might be of relevance to other areas 
of the debate.  
Code 0 : positional politics 
Code 1 : alternative proposal  
Code 2: mediating proposal 
Appendix 2.  Inter-coder reliability tests for a sample of the leader debates data 
 % agreement Cohen's κ Spearman's ρ N of codes 
Level of justification 86 0.81 0.88 73 
Content of justification  99 0.96 -- 73 
Respect to groups 96 0.81 0.82 72 
Respect to demands 90 0.83 0.77 70 
Respect to 
counterarguments 
87 0.81 0.88 43 
Constructive politics 98 0.97 -- 55 
Overall 93   386 
  
Table 1: DQI Scores for the 2010 U.K. Leaders Debates 
 
Criterion % Coded  Criterion  % Coded 
     
Constructive Politics    Respect towards 
Groups 
 
Positional Politics  100  None 3 
Alternative  0  Neutral 86 
Mediating  0  Explicit  12 
     
Level of Justification    Respect towards 
Demands 
 
None 23  None 41 
Inferior 28  Neutral 51 
Qualified 33  Explicit 8 
Sophisticated  16    
     
Content of 
Justification 
  Respect to 
Counterarguments 
 
Constituency/Group 26  Ignored 19 
Neutral  69  Degraded 23 
Common Good 5  Neutral 7 
   Valued 2 
   No Counter on Table 49 
Table 2: House of Commons and Leaders’ Debates Compared 
 Leaders’ 
Debates 
% 
House of 
Commons 
% 
Significance DQI ‘Winner’ Strength 
Constructive politics 
Positional politics 
Alternative proposal 
Mediating  
 
100.0 
0 
0 
 
94.0 
6.0 
0 
χ2=14.2, 
 p<.001 Westminster > Leaders 
Weak 
(tau-c=.06) 
Level of justification 
None 
Inferior 
Qualified 
Sophisticated 
 
23.4 
28.0 
33.0 
15.6 
 
43.2 
18.9 
9.7 
28.2 
χ2=58.3,  
p<.001 Leaders > Westminster 
Weak 
(tau-c = -.10) 
Content of Justification  
      Constituency/Group Interests 
      Neutral  
      Common Good (Utilitarian) 
      Common Good (Difference) 
 
26.2 
68.5 
5.0 
0.3 
 
3.4 
81.1 
2.4 
13.1 
χ2=81.8,  
p<.001 Westminster > Leaders 
Medium/Strong  
(C = 0.37) 
Respect to Groups 
      None 
      Neutral 
      Explicit  
 
2.5 
85.6 
11.9 
 
1.5 
89.8 
8.7 
χ2=2.1,  
n.s  Leaders > Westminster 
Weak  
(tau-c = -.10) 
Respect to Demands 
      None 
      Neutral 
      Explicit 
 
41.3 
50.5 
8.3 
 
12.1 
80.6 
7.3 
χ2=53.8,  
p<.001 Westminster > Leaders 
Medium  
(tau – c = 0.25)  
Respect to Counterarguments 
      Ignored 
      Included but degraded 
      Included but neutral  
      Included and valued 
 
37.8 
45.7 
13.4 
3.0 
 
18.9 
46.6 
27.7 
6.8 
χ2=23.1,  
p<.001 Westminster > Leaders 
Medium 
(C=.24, tau-c = 0.27) 
Overall respect (mean) 2.08 2.66 t=5.28, 
 p<.001 
Westminster > Leaders Medium/Strong (ES = .55) 
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